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‘On the one hand information wants to be expensive, because it's so valuable. 
The  right  information  in  the  right  place  just  changes  your  life.  On  the  other 
hand, information wants to be free, because the cost of getting it out is getting 
lower and lower all the time.’
This quote from Stewart Brand frames the debate on the pricing of Public Sector 
Information.  But  the  term  free  is  itself  ambiguous  in  English.  Public  Sector 
Information can be ‘free as in speech’ that is, available for access, downloading 
and modification, without being ‘free as in beer’, that is given away for no charge, 
as is implied in the phrase ‘free beer’.
1 The terms libre and gratis are often used 
to refer to this distinction.
In economic terms, the cost of getting information from providers to users may 
be separated into several parts. The first, declining rapidly is the marginal cost 
of transmitting and receiving existing information. The second, also declining 
rapidly  is  the  cost  to  users  of  identifying  and  locating  potentially  useful 
information. 
The  third,  and  a  central  focus  here,  is  the  cost  of  the  transaction  in  which 
information  is  transferred.  This  cost  will  depend  crucially  on  whether 
information is provided freely (in both the libre and gratis senses) or subject to 
restrictions and requirements for payments. Beginning with the work of Coase 
(1937,  1960)  and  Williamson  (1979,  1999)  economists  have  increasingly 
recognised  the  centrality  of  transactions  costs  in  determining  feasible,  and 
socially desirable, modes of economic organisation.
The central finding of this project is that, under the conditions created by Web 
2.0, making information effectively freely available (libre) generally requires that 
it be provided free of charge (gratis). As the costs of disseminating and accessing 
1 The juxtaposition of free beer and free speech is attributed to Richard Stallings, quoted in Gay 
(2002).5
information have declined, the transactions costs associated with charging for 
access to information, with the concomitant requirement to control subsequent 
redistribution have come to constitute a major barrier to access in themselves.   
As a result, the case for free (gratis) provision of Public Sector Information is 
even stronger than has already been recognised.
From the transactions cost perspective, it is equally important that the provision 
of information should not be burdened with unnecessary restrictions on use, such 
as  those  associated  with  standard  copyright.  A  good  default  choice,  which 
provides for free (libre) use, protects this freedom in reuse and is consistent with 
free (gratis) is CC BT. Where the promotion of free sharing is actively desired, 




The ideas I’ve associated with default rules are commonly, but 
not,  I  think,  very  helpfully,  discussed  in  terms  of  the 
supposedly ‘viral’ nature of licenses, particularly in relation to 
software and the Gnu General Public License. The idea of a 
default rule clarifies what is going on here. You can only have 
one default. At one time this was public domain (since it was 
necessary  to  make  a  specific  claim  for  copyright).  Now  it’s 
copyright, and advocates of strong IP take this as normal and 
natural. But if you want to use GPL or CC material with a 
share-alike license you have to adopt this default. From the 
viewpoint of people who take copyright as natural, but see CC 
material expanding, this is like a virus.5
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Information as an economic good
Information is a special kind of economic good, and the information collected, 
produced, stored and disseminated by cultural institutions is a special kind of 
information;  in  fact,  cultural  institutions  deal  with  a  variety  of  kinds  of 
information  associated  with  media  and  physical  artefacts.  Economists  and 
policymakers have struggled to understand the economic role of information and 
its implications for public policy in education, innovation and cultural policy, not 
to mention the policy process itself.
The rise of the Internet and related technologies for distributing, storing and 
transforming  information  has  radically  transformed  many  information-related 
activities,  while  leaving  other  parts  of  the  information  economy  largely 
unaffected. Huge areas of activity have grown from nothing in the space of a few 
years,  with  the  most  spectacular  examples  including  ‘Web  2.0’  developments 
based on user networks such as Wikipedia, Facebook and the blogosphere.
The rise of the Internet has invalidated many of the background assumptions 
made  in  discussions  of  the  information  economy.  For  example,  it  is  widely 
supposed that any Internet-based version of the services historically provided by 
newspapers must be supported by a viable ‘business model’. No such model has 
yet become apparent, but Internet sites and network providing news, opinion, 
and discussion of issues such as sport, fashion and family life have nevertheless 
proliferated.  The  quality  of  the  material  presented  in  this  sites  ranges  from 
abysmal (incoherent rants and reckless untruth) to specialist coverage superior 
to anything previously accessible to the general public, and much more up-to-
date  than  the  academic  journal  literature  (the  ‘psephblogs’  covering  opinion 
polling data provide an excellent example)
Any  analysis  of  the  information  economy  must  begin  with  a  careful 
reconsideration of the applicability or otherwise of existing models and a broader   
and  more  sympathetic  understanding  of  human  motivation,  than  the  simple 7
model of narrow self-interested that has served economic analysis (often, though 
not always, quite effectively) in the past. Hunter and Quiggin (2007) discuss a 
wide range of possible motivations.
The  opportunities  and  challenges  created  by  the  Internet-based  information 
economy are both complex and potentially radically transformative as they relate 
to  cultural  institutions  such  as  galleries,  libraries,  archives  and  museums 
(acronymically,  the  GLAM  sector),  not  to  mention  botanical  and  zoological 
gardens,  and  performing  arts  bodies.  Even  though  the  challenges  cannot  be 
ignored, the opportunities are by far the biggest news.   Most obviously digital 
technologies can radically reduce the costs of disseminating cultural information 
through the internet – but this is implied in ‘Web 1.0’.  
Web  2.0  opens  up  wider  vistas.  It  enables  GLAM  institutions  to  combine 
information  from  different  sources,  generically  referred  to  as  ‘mashups’,  or  to 
release their content so as to release their content so as to enable and invite 
others  to  mash  the  data  up.  And  it  enables  them  to  access  the  enthusiasm, 
labour, experience and even the artefacts of volunteers within the community as 
the  Powerhouse  did  when  lodging  its  own  digitised  photographs  on  Flickr  to 
receive an avalanche of contextual commentary and contributions in kind from 
the public. 
On the other hand, processes such as digitisation can involve substantial fixed 
costs. These add to the costs of the traditional mission of GLAM institutions, 
based on the collection, storage and management of physical collections, and are 
being incurred in conjunction with sustained financial stringency in the public 
sector, reflected in the routine application of ‘efficiency dividends’ to public sector 
budgets.
In these circumstances, it is important to consider how best to maximise the 
value of the information embodied in GLAM institutions, taking account of the 7
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need to finance both collection and maintenance of physical collections and the 
cost of digitisation.
Information as a public good
Information is commonly analysed as a public good, like air quality. The crucial 
characteristics of a public good are non-rivalry and non-excludability (Samuelson 
1954).
Non-rivalry means that consumption of the good by one person does not reduce 
its availability for others. So, in the case of improved air quality, the benefit to 
me does not detract from the benefit to you. This property distinguishes public 
goods from other goods and services that are commonly provided by the public 
sector, such as education services. If my child is given a spot in a given class, the 
same  spot  cannot  be  provided  to  your  child,  except  by  providing  additional 
resources.
Non-excludability  means  that,  if  the  good  is  made  available  to  some,  others 
cannot  be  prevented  from  consuming  it.  Air  quality  is  non-excludable  in  this 
sense, since if the air is clean, it is clean for everybody. However, few goods are 
perfectly non-excludable. In general, public good analysis is applicable whenever 
the  costs  of  excluding  consumers  exceed  the  possible  benefit  (typically  the 
amount they could be induced to pay).
Information is strongly non-rival. In fact, the more people who are aware of a 
given piece of information, the more likely others are to become aware of it. On 
the  other  hand,  information  is,  to  some  extent,  excludable.  Most  obviously, 
‘keeping a secret’ consists precisely in excluding others from information. Under 
some circumstances, information can be confined to a group of paying customers 
through the use of legal and technological restrictions. However, as the number 
of people who are aware of a secret increases, so does the likelihood of a ‘leak’ to 
unauthorised outsiders.9
  The  effectiveness  of  technological  restrictions  on  information  transfer  has 
declined  steadily  as  the  ease  of  reproducing  information  has  increased. 
Responses  such  as  copy  protection  have  been,  at  best,  partially  successful. 
Attempts have been made, with limited success, to adapt legislation and taxation 
schemes to the advance of technology.
 The development of the photocopier and the adoption of policy responses such as 
Statutory License Schemes were one manifestation of this process. Similarly, the 
use of audiotape and videotape was met with private copying levy. Legislation to 
create such a scheme was passed in 1989. However, this legislation was declared 
unconstitutional  in  Australian  Tape  Manufacturers  Association  Ltd  v 
Commonwealth  [1993] HCA 10; (1993) 176 CLR 480 (11 March 1993) .
Since  then,  the  development  of  the  Internet  has  meant  that  most  kinds  of 
information are effectively non-excludable. Information in almost any physical or 
electromagnetic form can be digitised at relatively low cost. Once digitised it can 
be  reproduced  and  distributed  to  an  extent  limited  only  by  the  number  of 
computers  linked  to  the  Internet.  Legal  constraints  have  proved  largely 
ineffectual  or  impractical  as  the  costs  of  legal  enforcement  are  increasingly 
outstripping the benefits of so doing. 
Information as an experience good
An experience good is a product or service where product characteristics such as 
quality or price are difficult to observe in advance, but which can be determined 
by  consuming  the  good.  The  concept  was  developed  by  Nelson  (1970)  who 
distinguishes experience goods from ‘search goods’ for which characteristics are 
known in the absence of consumption. The standard theory of demand, in which 
preferences are well-defined and unchanging, implicitly assumes that all goods 
are search goods.
Information, particularly in the form of education, is an archetypal example of 
an experience good. Someone discovering new information cannot, in advance, 9
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know  how  this  information  will  change  their  beliefs  about  the  world  or  their 
preferences
2. Indeed, it may be argued that ‘experience goods’ are precisely those 
in which consumption of the good is bundled with the acquisition of information. 
Further,  if  we  believe  that  humans  are  generally  reasonable  beings,  their 
preferences after the receipt of information will generally be better than those 
they had before.   Where this is a relatively simple observation in the case of a 
specific  piece  of  information  –  say  whether  a  particular  surgeon  has  a  good 
bedside manner – it has deeper implications for education. For to simply describe 
the outcome of an education as simply changing preferences impoverishes our 
appreciation of what is at issue. 
Just as we believe that years of formal education will generally transform lives 
for the better so cultural institutions form part of the network of cultural assets 
of  an  educated  and  continually  self  educating  community.    They  hold  the 
promise, both in their contribution to formal education and outside it, that our 
lives may be transformed in ways small and large for the better. 
The network character of information
In  general,  consumption  of  goods  and  services  can  be  analysed  reasonably 
straightforwardly  in  terms  of  a  vector  of  quantities,  with  each  element 
representing the amount consumed of some good or service. To some extent this 
is true of information, and of the goods and services with which it is associated. 
For  example,  we  can  and  do  measure  sales  of  books,  visits  to  museums  and 
galleries, expenditure on Internet connections and so forth.
But the actual value of information to any recipient of that information depends 
upon a complex set of connections with their knowledge of the world, determined 
2 This point needs to be qualified. For some kinds of information, such as a standard weather 
forecast, individuals will be aware of all possible outcomes, and can in principle know how they 
value  any  particular  outcome.  Hence,  information  about  the  outcome  has  the  character  of  a 
search good. The Bayesian theory of information deals with this case.11
by  the  information  they  have  received  in  the  past.  So,  for  example,  the 
experience  of  visiting  an  exhibition  at  an  art  gallery  will  differ  radically 
depending on the visitor’s knowledge of the history of art, the social context in 
which the artist worked, physical theories of light, colour and perspective and so 
forth. 
Amateurs and volunteers
One  of  the  striking  features  of  Web  2.0  and  the  associated  technological 
developments  is  the  extent  to  which  crucial  contributions  have  been  made 
without  any  direct,  or,  in  many  cases,  indirect,  financial  reward.  The  most 
striking  example  is  surely  the  Wikipedia  project,  where  an  almost  entirely 
voluntary  effort  has  generated,  in  many  different  languages,  the  most 
comprehensive  encyclopedia  ever  produced.  But  there  are  many  more  such 
examples, such as the Gracenote music database, a commercial enterprise which 
provides automatic identification of music tracks on CDs, a service valuable to 
anyone using software such as iTunes. All the information is uploaded by users 
cataloging their own collections.
A number of writers, including Raymond (1998), Benkler (2004), Quiggin (2006) 
and Hunter and Quiggin (2008) have discussed the range of motives, from gift 
exchange  to  norms  of  reciprocity  to  pure  desire  for  communication  that  lead 
amateurs  and  volunteers  to  contribute  to  projects  of  this  kind.  What  is  most 
significant in the present context is the fact that the public good character of 
information,  combined  with  the  capacity  for  communication  created  by  the 
Internet  generates  conditions  that  allow  voluntary  action  to  be  effective  in  a 
myriad of ways that were never previously feasible.
In  public  sector  contexts,  where  voluntary  effort  has  largely  been  seen  as  a 
source of low-cost labour, to be channeled into areas where it does not compete 
with the activities of paid employees, the new role of voluntary activity presents 
a considerable challenge. In particular, in relation to public sector information, 11
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any restriction on the way in which information is presented and used may forgo 
opportunities  for  voluntary  efforts  which  may  represent,  and  re-present, 
information in ways that were never considered by the original source.
In  economic  analysis,  the  potential  for  re-use  may  be  regarded  as  a  type  of 
positive externality, that is a benefit that is not mediated by market prices. The 
standard policy response to positive externalities is the provision of a subsidy. 
So,  the  case  for  free  provision  of  information  is  bolstered  by  consideration  of 
amateur and voluntary activity.
Special characteristics of cultural information
The GLAM (Galleries, Libraries, Archives, Museums) sector is largely a product 
of the 19th century, or more precisely, Hobsbawm’s (1988) ’ ‘long 19th century’ 
from the French Revolution in 1789 to the outbreak of the Great War in 1914. 
Although collections of various kinds were put together from the Renaissance 
onwards, the idea of publicly funded and publicly accessible cultural institutions 
belongs to the long 19th century, as do many of the most prominent examples   
such as the Louvre (1793),   Library of Congress (1800), the French National   
Archives (1790), and the British Natural History Museum (1859). During the 
19th  century,  the  GLAM  sector  developed  a  set  of  institutions,  cultural 
associations  and  supporting  professions  that  remained  relatively  stable 
throughout the ‘short 20th century’, from 1914 to the end of the Cold War in 
1989. 
The 19th century GLAM model was focused on a physical collection of objects, 
typically housed in an imposing and centrally located building. The core mission 
of GLAM institutions was to preserve and develop this collection, to present it in 
ways that helped to transmit national and global culture to the general public 
and to make material available for scholarly research. Although the collections 13
changed  over  time,  and  there  were  significant  technological  advances,  the 
experience of the public in visiting a GLAM institution in, say, 1990, was not 
fundamentally different from that of 1900.
By contrast with this long period of relative stability, the past twenty years have 
seen radical changes. Two interrelated changes are particularly noteworthy. The 
first is the rise of the concept of ‘creative industries’, seen as a central source of 
innovation and growth in a post-industrial economy. Although this idea initial 
focused  on  the  production  of  audiovisual  media  such  as  film,  GLAM  sector 
institutions  are  increasingly  seen  as  central  to  the  development  of  an  active 
creative  industries  sector.  This  forward-looking  view  marks  a  radical  change 
from  an  older  view  of  these  institutions  as  focused  on  the  preservation  and 
transmission of a cultural heritage from the past.
The second, of more central interest here, is the development of the Internet and 
the associated information economy. The crucial effect of the Internet is that, 
rather  than  being  tied  to  discrete  physical  objects,  such  as  books,  musical 
records,  films  and  so  on,  information  has  become  (more  or  less)  infinitely 
reproducible and transmissible.
The  rise  of  the  information  economy  has  been  a  challenging,  but  generally 
welcome, development for libraries and archives. Although libraries and archives 
have  an  important  role  in  preserving  books  and  documents  considered  as 
physical objects, their primary focus has always been the information contained 
in these texts. The conversion of these texts to digital form, and the development 
of  systems  for  searching  and  retrieving  the  information  they  contain,  is  a 
challenging and costly task, but one that clearly represents a significant advance 
in  the  core  mission  these  institutions.  Further,  although  initial  costs  are 
significant, digitisation offers substantial long-run cost savings, many of which 
are already being realised. 13
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Consider  academic  journals  as  an  example.  Before  digitisation,  the  task  of 
locating,  and  obtaining  a  copy  of  an  academic  journal  article  based  on  some 
information about its author or contents was often difficult and time-consuming 
both  for  the  information  user  and  the  library  providing  the  information. 
Identifying the desired article would require physical access to a database such 
as  the  Social  Science  Citations  Index,  use  of  which  often  required  skilled 
assistance or training. Having identified the article, it was necessary to locate 
the journal in the library catalog, and gain access to the relevant volume, which 
might often be mislaid or in the hands of another user. For items not held by the 
library concerned, it was necessary to resort to the slow and resource-intensive 
procedure of an interlibrary loan. Finally, the user needed to make a physical 
copy of the article, and store the relevant citation information.
Now compare the same task after digitisation. Users can connect to their library 
system from any location, search using a variety of powerful engines (with skills 
enhanced  by  daily  use  of  a  wide  variety  of  Internet  search  techniques)  and 
connect directly from search results to a repository such as   JSTOR. They can 
then download the article, along with citation information, in a format suitable 
for a bibliographic database, and automatically place the PDF file of the article 
in a collection organised by year and author. The entire process, which would 
have typically taken at least an hour, and often much longer, in the pre-Internet 
era, can be completed in a matter of seconds.
Journal articles are perhaps the most striking example, but the digitisation of 
books and archival collections is proceeding apace, and is already reducing costs 
of access to a wide variety of library and archival material, as well as offering 
significant cost savings to libraries and archives themselves. 
By contrast, for galleries and museums, physical objects are, and are likely to 
remain, essential. Catalog information and visual images may be placed on the 
Internet,  facilitating  users’  search  for  items  relevant  to  their  interests.  But 15
unlike texts, physical objects cannot easily be converted into digital information; 
rather  users  can  obtain  a  partial  description  of  the  objects  in  question.  And, 
given the heterogeneity of physical objects, many different systems of description 
will be required, and each will require specialised interpretative skills.
The  result  is  that  making  descriptive  information  generally  available  on  the 
Internet  may  increase  the  costs  of  information  provision  for  galleries  and 
museums.  As  the  group  of  information  users  with  access  to  descriptive 
information  expands,  the  volume  of  demands  for  assistance  will  increase. 
Moreover,  whereas  regular  users  of  the  physical  collection  are  likely  to  be 
familiar with classification systems and with the general characteristics of items 
of interest, the Internet provides access to users who may lack these skills.
It  follows  that  models  of  Public  Sector  Information  pricing  based  on  the 
assumption  that  information,  once  generated,  is  a  free  good,  may  be 
inappropriate  for  the  gallery/museum  sector,  or  at  least,  may  require  more 
careful  application  than  for  providers  of  information  in  the  form  of  text  or 
numerical data.
Summary
The  special  characteristics  of  information  as  a  good  mean  that  standard 
economic measures of willingness to pay are of only limited use in assessing the 
value of information. First, the non-excludability of information means that it is 
typically impossible to require payment from all users of information, so that 
willingness  to  pay  must  be  elicited  indirectly.  But,  more  importantly,  the 
cumulative network character of information, reflected in the ‘experience good’ 
nature of information acquisition means that attempts to value any particular 
piece of information are futile, except in very specific cases where all possible 
values of information are known in advance.15
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The cost of information
Information  ‘wants  to  be  expensive’  not  only  because,  as  is  noted  in  Stewart 
Brand’s famous aphorism, ‘the right information in the right place just changes 
your  life’,  but  also  because  information  is  costly  to  produce,  manage  and 
distribute. The need to finance the creation of information and the value of that 
information to the right users generate incentives to charge prices for access to 
information. These incentives must be set against the public good character of 
information.
The cost of information
The  most  obvious  and  often  the  largest  cost  of  information  is  the  cost  of 
discovering  or  creating  new  information.  A  significant  proportion  of  society’s 
most valuable intellectual resources, and large quantities of physical capital are 
devoted to the tasks of intellectual, technological and creative innovation, all of 
which  may  be  encompassed  by  the  notion  of  creating  new  information.  The 
financing of innovation is discussed below.
A further set of costs are involved in integrating new discoveries into an existing 
body of knowledge which can be broadly communicated through the education 
system  and  other  processes.  These  costs  like  the  costs  of  creating  new 
information,  are  largely  independent  of  the  extent  to  which  information  is 
distributed.  This  category  includes  costs  such  as  those  incurred  in  the 
digitisation of the collections and catalogs of cultural institutions. 
Finally, there are costs of distributing information. As Brand notes, the cost of 
distribution or ‘getting information out’ has declined to the point where, in many 
contexts distribution can be treated as being costless. 
In  many  contexts,  but  not  in  all.  Complex  forms  of  information  may  require   
interpretation  involving  direct  interaction  between  information  providers  and 
information users. For example, users of digital catalogs may require help from 17
librarians  to  understand  the  results  of  their  searches.  The  costs  of  this 
interpretation process remain substantial.
Potential users of information also face a number of costs. First, there is the 
price, if any, paid to the owners or distributors of information. Second, associated 
with this price is a transaction cost, associated with making a payment, keeping 
records to demonstrate legitimate ownership, maintaining required passwords, 
and so on. Third, there is an access cost consisting of costs incurred in searching 
for, copying and storing information. Of these, the transaction cost and access 
cost components represent a net cost to society, while the price is a transfer to 
the information owner.
Historically,  access  costs  for  information  have  been  high.  In  particular,  these 
costs  were commonly large in relation to any transactions costs incurred in the 
process of seeking information.
As an illustration, consider an example generated by reading the first article 
selected  using  the  Wikipedia  random  search  function  (about  the  Battle  of 
Okinawa in World War II). Consider an information seeker, prior to the Internet, 
who  might,  perhaps,  have  read  a  newspaper  reference  to  controversy  the 
presence of US troops on Okinawa, and sought to develop an informed opinion on 
the issue. 
A  general  reference  source,  such  as  an  encyclopedia,  might  have  some 
information, but would typically provide only limited further references (leaving 
aside the fact that many information seekers might not have easy access to an 
encyclopedia).  To  gain  further  information,  it  would  be  necessary  to  visit  a 
library,  use  a  card  catalog,  and  locate  books  on  the  topic,  which  could  be 
borrowed or read in the library.
 A more ambitious goal, such as the collection of a set of reference materials on 
the topic, would require manual transcription or use of a photocopier, along with 
development  of  a  more  or  less  efficient  storage  system.  Going  further,  and 17
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seeking to locate periodical and newspaper discussion of the issue would be a 
task requiring substantial research skills and weeks of effort.  
Depending  on  the  individual’s  value  of  time,  and  the  pricing  policies  of 
information sources, these access costs might be large or small relative to the 
payment required to acquire information, for example by buying books on the 
topic,  or  by  paying  for  access  to  commercial  databases  accessible  through 
libraries. But, almost certainly, access costs would far outweigh any transactions 
costs associated with purchasing information.
The  development  of  the  Internet  has  reduced  access  costs  to  trivial  levels.  A 
simple  Google  search  “Okinawa  +  US  +  troops”,  produces  hundreds  of  useful 
references  (as  well  as  some  that  are  less  useful!),  along  with  suggestions  for 
further searches. Using the results of these searches, it would be possible, even 
for an individual with limited specialist skills, to assemble a large collection of 
useful information in a short period.
Given some background knowledge and expertise and an initial investment in 
research  skills,  (more  modest  that  required  in  the  pre-Internet  period),  the 
creation of a high-quality reference database on any topic is now a relatively 
straightforward undertaking. Indeed, the reduction in access costs has been so 
dramatic that the primary access cost for information is now the time required to 
read, view or listen to information that has been acquired at such low cost. 
There  are,  it  is  true,  some  additional  access  costs  associated  with  use  of  the 
Internet.  There  is  no  simple  way  of  distinguishing  reliable  from  unreliable 
information,  comparable  to  the  filtering  that  takes  place  when  books  and 
periodicals are collected by, for example, public libraries. Superficially appealing 
tests, such as the apparent professionalism of a website are more fallible than 
the  comparable  tests  applied  to  traditional  media,  such  as  books  and 
newspapers, where high physical quality is hard to duplicate.19
However, relatively simple rules, such as confining searches to sites of known 
reliability, or favourably linked by sites known to be reliable, provide a filter at 
least as powerful as that available to readers of books and magazines. And given 
moderate caution, users of the Internet have access to far more sophisticated 
checks  than  those  available  before  the  rise  of  the  Internet.  For  example, 
presented with the views of a putative expert source on, say, an environmental 
issue, in traditional media, readers or viewers have little to go on beyond the 
one-sentence description typically provided in such media presentations, which 
might indicate an obscure organisational affiliation.
By contrast with the decline in access costs, transactions costs have remained 
high  and,  arguably  increased.  Whereas  older  search  technologies  might  have 
alerted information-seekers to the existence of a substantial body of information 
collected in a book, newer technologies point to a disparate variety of information 
sources.    In  the  case  of  the  book,  the  transactions  cost  of  a  purchase  would 
normally  be  small  in  absolute  terms,  and  relative  to  the  purchase  price.  By 
contrast, if desired information is held in a large number of separate collections, 
each protected by a paywall the transactions costs associated with gaining access 
may be large.
Collection, maintenance and storage costs for cultural information
The long term social cost of information is dominated by the cost of collection, 
maintenance  and  storage  of  the  data.  In  some  cases,  data  is  collected  in  the 
course of business, 
The situation of cultural institutions such as galleries, libraries, archives and 
museums is rather different. In a general sense, these institutions have always 
been  devoted  to  the  collection,  maintenance,  storage  and  dissemination  of 
information. However, in the past, this information took the form of physical 19
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objects, such as paintings, books, documents and cultural artefacts. To make a 
representation this information available and information replicable at low cost, 
as is now feasible with digital data of all kinds, it is necessary to undertake a 
process  of  digitisation.  This  process  will  typically  be  more  costly  than  the 
distribution of the resulting data on the Internet or through physical media such 
as compact disks. 
For most Australian cultural institutions, digitisation has taken the form of an 
unfunded  mandate.  That  is,  digitisation  has  been  added  to  the  institutional 
mission,  but  no  additional  funding  has  been  provided  to  cover  the  associated 
costs.  On  the  contrary,  since  the  mid-1980s,  cultural  institutions,  like  other 
government  agencies,  have  been  subject  to  continuous  ‘efficiency  dividends’, 
amounting, in cumulative terms to cuts in real funding of more than 30 per cent. 
In principle, efficiency dividends are supposed to reflect cost savings in existing 
activities that can be used to fund the cost of new programs. On average across 
the  public  sector  as  a  whole,  the  result  is  that  government  expenditure  has 
grown  broadly  in  line  with  national  income.  However,  as  the  Parliamentary 
Public Accounts and Audit Committee has reported, this process has not worked 
well for smaller agencies, including cultural institutions. 
The efficiency dividend policy does not apply, at least directly, to revenue, such 
as user charges and private sponsorship, derived from agency operations. Hence, 
the policy has (and is intended to have) the effect of encouraging agencies to seek 
and expand such revenue sources.
The  absence  of  additional  funding  for  digitisation,  and  the  pressure  for 
continuous reductions in expenditure on the traditional collection, maintenance 
and storage mission is, therefore, an important factor in determining the pricing 
policies of cultural institutions. Such institutions will typically be very reluctant 
to  give  up  existing  revenue  sources  in  the  absence  of  reliable  replacement 21
funding, even if economic analysis suggests that free provision of information is 
likely to yield substantial net social benefits.
In the absence of additional funding, or the capacity to implement differentiated 
pricing systems (discussed below) cultural institutions face an inevitable trade-
off between collection and access. That is, income foregone through free provision 
of access implies a reduction in the volume or quality of new material collected, 
or  in  expenditure  on  preservation,  classification  and  digitisation  of  existing 
material. Focusing on the final point, in circumstances where access to digitised 
collections is free of charge, the rate of digitisation may be slower. 
Thus  users  are  faced  with  a  choice  between  a  more  comprehensive  digitised 
collection,  subject  to  pricing  and  the  associated  transactions  costs,  or  a  less 
comprehensive  collection  available  without  such  costs.  The  experience  of 
unsuccessful attempts at imposing premium pricing for access to material such 
as the archives of the New York Times suggests for material aimed at Internet 
users in general, free distribution is likely to be preferred, even at the cost of 
comprehensiveness or specialised tools. However, specialist users of particular 
collections,  who  are  also  likely  to  have  long-standing  relationships  with  the 
institution concerned, may prefer the former option.
The value of information
There is a well developed theory of the value of information for the case when 
information is a search good, that is, when all possible values for information are 
known in advance. This theory, based on Bayesian decision theory, is applied 
most commonly in relation to weather forecasts. A simple exposition is given by 
Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker (1977). However, this analysis is of little value 
for the case when, as is almost invariably true in relation to cultural institutions, 
information is an experience good.21
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The hypertext-based Internet allows fundamental changes in the way in which 
text is used to communicate information. Similarly radical changes are gradually 
emerging  in  other  media,  through  phenomena  such  as  ‘mashups’  in  which 
samples from a variety of media are combined, sometimes with the inclusion of 
original  material,  to  produce  new  products.  The  aim  may  be  informative,  for 
example, combining a Google map with an Amazon database of books relevant to 
particular  locations  http://www.junglethingy.com/.  Or  the  object  may  be  the 
creation  of  new  artistic  works  perhaps  combining  one  work  with  an  earlier 
influence as in this combination of a Hockney painting with a still from the film 
Milk  http://towleroad.typepad.com/.shared/image.html?/photos/uncategorized/
2008/12/16/hockneymilkmashup.jpg .
The price of information
The problem of pricing for public sector information may be considered in the 
light of the earlier discussion of financing for innovation. The general problem is 
one of financing the creation, collection and management of information in the 
public  sector.  In  general,  ex  post  payments  such  as  prizes  are  not  applicable 
here, so the primary choice is between direct funding from general revenue and 
the  use  of  the  proceeds  of  sales  at  prices  that  exceed  the  marginal  cost  of 
provision. 
Differentiated pricing schemes
One  possible  response  to  the  need  for  a  balance  between  the  benefits  of  free 
provision of information and the need for revenue to finance data collection and 
digitisation is the provision of differentiated information products. In part, such 
differentiation arises naturally under conditions of marginal cost pricing. 23
For example, the Australian Government Spatial Data Access and Pricing Policy 
offers three forms of data delivery: Online, Packaged and Customised. They are 
defined as follows: 
• Online. Online data is made available for downloading by the user 
from the Internet.
• Packaged.  A  Packaged  product  is  one  that  is  provided  with 
minimum processing, e.g. on a CD-ROM, resulting in a standard product that is 
produced in bulk.
• Customised.  A  Customised  product  is  one  where  a  significant 
amount  of  processing  is  required  to  meet  the  requirements  of  each  client, 
resulting in an individually prepared product for each transaction.
And imposes the following pricing rules
• Online  fundamental  spatial  data  will  be  made  available  Free,  as 
soon as appropriate technology becomes available within the custodian agency 
(typically, marginal cost in this case will be close to zero)
• Packaged  fundamental  spatial  data  will  be  made  available  at  a 
price not exceeding the Marginal Cost of Transfer (typically, the cost of printing 
and delivery an additional CD_ROM or other packaged product
• Customised fundamental spatial data will be made available at a 
price  not  exceeding  the  Full  Cost  of  Transfer,  ,  which  includes  all  the  costs 
directly  related  to  the  customisation  and  distribution  function  (as  opposed  to 
collection, maintenance and storage of the data). Restrictions may be applied to 
the  use  of  data  supplied  at  Full  Cost.  Those  restrictions  may  include  the 
application of a royalty.
In view of the general analysis of marginal cost and free pricing provided in this 
report,  the  only  point  in  this  policy  that  requires  further  explication  is  the 
possible requirement for a royalty payment. Such a payment is not in general 23
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consistent with a marginal cost pricing policy but may be justified where the 
distribution function as a whole incurs unallocated ‘overhead’ costs.
In addition to differentiating the type of data provided and the format in which it 
is provided, the Spatial Data Access and Pricing Policy provides differentiated 
license  conditions.  The  Spatial  Data  Access  and  pricing  policy  imposes  more 
restrictive  conditions  on  purchasers  of  customised  fundamental  spatial  data, 
including possible royalty payments for commercial use.
The Spatial Data Access and Pricing Policy is appropriate, given the assumption 
that the initial task of data collection, storage and maintenance is financed from 
general revenue, and that raw data can be made available online at relatively 
modest cost.
However, in the event that the policy was required to raise net revenue, it might 
be  possible  to  adopt  a  different  approach  to  licensing  conditions.  Online  and 
packaged  data  might  be  made  available  on  the  basis  of  a  license  for  non-
commercial use (the default Creative Commons license conditions of Attribution, 
Non-Commercial, Share-Alike would be well suited to this purpose), while the 
conditions  for  access  to  customised  data,  permitting  commercial  derivatives 
subject to a royalty payment, would remain unchanged. 
For many purposes, and given the availability of customised alternatives. the 
non-commercial,  attribution,  share-alike  version  of  the  Creative  Commons 
License  may be seen as default rule. he optimal default rule is one that protects 
most rights the public creator might want to enforce, while allowing (without 
special  permission)  most  uses  that  would  be  regarded  as  acceptable.  Public 
domain  fails  on  the  first  count,  since  it  allows  for  private  appropriation. 25
Standard copyright fails on the second count since it restricts many beneficial 
users. 
A  differentiated  license  system  would  be  reduce  the  potential  for  existing 
commercial users to switch to the free online product , since freely available data 
could be used only for internal purposes, and not for the creation of commercial 
derivative products.  
In economic terms, the impact on an existing commercial revenue stream from 
the introduction of a free non-commercial option would depend on the degree to 
which the two were substitutes. An associated quantitative measure is the cross-
price elasticity of demand.
There  are  some  avenues  by  which  that  the  general  availability  of  free 
information would increase the demand for customised services. First, different 
kinds of information are likely to be complements. The ‘mashup’ phenomenon 
provides an illustration of the way in which combinations of information from 
different  sources  can  produce  new  and  enhanced  outputs.  In  some  cases,  a 
mashup  might  combine  freely  available  data  (for  example  spatial  data)  with 
limited quantities of customised data.
Hypertext and the paywall problem
Despite the massive variety of information it carries, the World Wide Web is 
ultimately  based  on  text,  and,  more  specifically  on  hypertext.  The  central 
innovations  that  gave  rise  to  the  Web  were  HTML  (Hyper  Text  Markup 
Language)  and  HTTP  (Hyper  Text  Transfer  Protocol).  The  centrality  of  these 
innovations and of the hypertext links on which they rely has only increased over 
time.  In  particular,  the  dominant  search  engine  Google  relies  primarily  on 
tracking hyperlinks between pages as a way of determining the ranking given to 
sites associated with particular search topics. The role of hyperlinks was further 25
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enhanced  by  the  rise  of  blogs  and  other  “Web  2.0”  technologies.  For  blogs  in 
particular, hyperlinks are a crucial medium of exchange.
Requirements for payments, and even some requirements for free registration, 
can disrupt the network of hyperlinks on which much of the value of the Web 
depends. 
Such  disruption  was  sought  after  by  some  early  commercial  users  of  the 
Internet. AOL, in particular, pursued a strategy of creating a “walled garden” 
containing a closed set of services available only to AOL users. The system was 
designed to make links outside the AOL system accessible to AOL users, but in 
such  a  way  that  they  remained  effectively  within  the  garden,  tied  to  AOL’s 
services  and  available  to  AOL’s  advertisers.  The  strategy  was  initially  highly 
successful,  but  it  ultimately  failed  for  two  reasons.  First,  AOL  users  found 
themselves  restricted  unnecessarily.  Second,  and  perhaps  even  more 
importantly,  the  strategy  precluded  links  from  the  Internet  at  large  into  the 
walled garden. As the Internet grew more rapidly than AOL itself could possibly 
do, the costs of this strategy became more and more evident. AOL eventually 
opened itself up, but too late to prevent its decline from one of the dominant 
presences on the Internet in 2000 to the marginal player it is today. 
The experience of other organisations has been similar. The New York Times 
briefly required payment for access to some content, including opinion columns, 
under  the  Times  Select  system.  Opinion  columns  are  commonly  linked  by 
bloggers,  for  praise  or  criticism,  and  such  links  are  an  important  source  of 
influence  and,  ultimately,  readers.  The  presence  of  a  “paywall”  discouraged 
bloggers from linking to Times columnists. http://civilities.net/TimesSelect-Buzz-
Aggregate  Along  with  the  direct  price  effects,  the  resulting  loss  of  influence 
caused the New York Times to abandon the experiment after two years, and also 
opened its entire archives free of charge.27
Transaction costs and the limitations of micropayments
The  huge  number  of  Web  pages  accessible  from  anywhere  in  the  world  by 
entering  a  URL  or  clicking  on  a  link  means  that  the  range  of  information 
resources  that  can  potentially  be  used  in  any  project  an  Internet  user  might 
undertake is effectively unlimited, except by the user’s own capacity to take in 
information. Averaging a couple of minutes per page, it would be possible to visit 
thousands of sites in a day, and take information from hundreds of them.
Obviously, however, even relatively modest charges for access and downloading   
(say, of the order of a dollar per item) would render such use of the Internet 
infeasible for the vast majority of users. Considerable attention has therefore 
been  devoted  to  the  idea  that  information-based  services  might  be  funded 
through ‘micropayments’, that is, very small payments (perhaps a few cents, or 
even fractions of a cent) for access to modest amounts of information. Nielsen 
(1998 http://www.useit.com/alertbox/980125.html) presented the most influential 
case for micropayments. He began by pointing out the limitations of alternative 
financing methods such upfront subscriptions and advertising, and argued that 
the saving in user time associated with faster ad-free access to Web pages would 
more than offset micropayment costs of a few cents per page.
A variety of ‘online currencies’ (such as beenz and flooz http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Internet_currency)  were  developed  in  the  late  1990s  with  the  aim  of 
facilitating  such  micropayments.  A  number  of  news  and  media  organisations 
have attempted to impose larger charges, of the order of $1 per download for 
access to content including newspaper articles, music, images and video.
The  results  have  been  almost  entirely  negative.  The  various  micropayments 
systems failed, as did most attempts to charge for content.
  At  a  theoretical  level,  Shirky  (2003,  http://www.shirky.com/writings/
fame_vs_fortune.html) argued that 27
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the  act  of  buying  anything,  even  if  the  price  is  very  small, 
creates what Nick Szabo calls mental transaction costs, the 
energy required to decide whether something is worth buying 
or  not,  regardless  of  price.  The  only  business  model  that 
delivers  money  from  sender  to  receiver  with  no  mental 
transaction  costs  is  theft,  and  in  many  ways,  theft  is  the 
unspoken inspiration for micropayment systems.
Among the rare successes, the most notable is Apple which has successfully sold 
music and iPhone applications through its iTunes store. Apple also sells videos, 
though with rather less success. 
Apple’s success has a number of special characteristics which have made it very 
hard to reproduce, such as tight integration between hardware, software and the 
market platform. Equally important has been the Record Industry Association of 
America’s  campaign  against  filesharing,  which,  will  achieving  only  limited 
success has driven a large number of users to prefer the legal iTunes option. This 
campaign has been hugely costly in both financial and public relations terms for 
the RIAA, but Apple has borne none of these costs. Even with all these positive 
factors, it has been estimated that the total sales from the iTunes store amount 
to 30 songs for each iPod/iPhone, as against a capacity of thousands of songs per 
device. 
Elasticity of demand
The effects of pricing policies depend on the elasticity of demand, that is by the 
proportional responsiveness of the quantity demanded to a change in price. For 
example, if a 10 per cent reduction in prices generates a 20 per cent increase in 
demand, the elasticity of demand is equal to 2 (that is, 20/10).   In general, the 29
higher the elasticity of demand, the greater the welfare cost associated with any 
given price in excess of marginal cost. 
It is essentially impossible to determine an elasticity of demand for information 
in general. However, it is possible, though difficult to make some estimates of the 
elasticity of demand for information derived, from the Internet.
Estimation  of  the  elasticity  of  demand  for  Internet  services  is  difficult  for  a 
number of reasons. These include which the most important is the difficulty of 
defining  quantity  measures,  the  speed  with  which  new  services  are  being 
introduced and prices of existence services are declining, and, conversely, the 
relatively slowness with which some changes in Internet usage diffuse through 
the population.
Much of the analysis to be presented here depends critically on the conclusion, 
supported by a wide range of evidence, that demand is elastic. The precise value 
of the elasticity, which will typically depend on the way outputs and prices are 
measured, is of rather less importance. 
Qualitative assessment of demand elasticity is straightforward. For any good or 
service for which demand is elastic, a decline in price will produce, other things 
equal, and increase in total expenditure. Conversely, where demand is inelastic, 
declining prices will result in declining expenditure.
Expenditure on Internet services has grown steadily since such services became 
available  in  the  early  1990s.  Expenditure  has  increased  on  all  margins  -  the 
number of households subscribing to such services, the number of services per 
household (many subscribing both to fixed-location and mobile services) and the 
expenditure  per  service.  Since  prices  have  declined  steadily,  the  evidence 
supports the view that demand is elastic.
With the qualifications given above, it is useful to consider some estimates of the 
elasticity  of  demand  for  Internet  services  in  general  and  for  information. 29
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Numerous  estimates,  including  ACMA  studies  for  Australia  suggest  that  the 
total volume of traffic on the Internet approximately doubles each year. The rate 
of price decline is harder to measure, but a plausible midrange estimate is that 
prices have declined by 30 per cent a year on average. This implies an elasticity 
of demand close to 2, which is consistent with a variety of estimates derived by 
Pollock (2009).
The implications of declining access costs and high transactions costs
The main contribution of this paper is to consider the implications for public 
sector information pricing of changes in the cost of information associated with 
the rise of Internet. Most importantly, while costs of distribution and access have 
declined markedly, the transaction costs of information services have remained 
high.
The central finding of this project is that, under the conditions created by Web 
2.0, making information effectively freely available (libre) generally requires that 
it be provided free of charge (gratis). As the costs of disseminating and accessing 
information have declined, the transactions costs associated with charging for 
access to information, and controlling subsequent redistribution have come to 
constitute a major barrier to access in themselves.  As a result, the case for free 
(gratis) provision of Public Sector Information is even stronger than has already 
been recognised.
From the transactions cost perspective, it is equally important that the provision 
of information should not be burdened with unnecessary restrictions on use, such 
as  those  associated  with  standard  copyright.  A  good  default  choice,  which 
provides for free (libre) use, protects this freedom in reuse and is consistent with 
free (gratis) pricing is the CC BY license
Work undertaken in the preparation of this report has shown how these points 
can  be  demonstrated,  and  estimates  of  the  social  loss  associated  with  priced 31
access to information derived, using a simple diagrammatic analysis of the kind 
familiar  to  undergraduate  economics.  The  central  finding  is  that,  under  the 
conditions created by Web 2.0, making information effectively freely available 
(libre) generally requires that it be provided free of charge (gratis). As the costs 
of disseminating and accessing information have declined, the transactions costs 
associated with charging for access to information, and controlling subsequent 
redistribution have come to constitute a major barrier to access in themselves.   
As a result, the case for free (gratis) provision of Public Sector Information is 
even stronger than has already been recognised.
A summary is presented below.
A summary of the argument
The analysis rests on two key points. First, as noted above, the welfare costs of 
raising revenue through above-marginal-cost pricing are higher, the higher is 
the  elasticity  or  price-responsiveness  of  demand  facing  information  owners. 
However,  the  effective  price  faced  by  information  users  includes  the  cost  of 
access to information and the transaction cost of making a purchase. The net 
price received by information providers excludes these items. 
The analysis undertaken for this project shows that as access costs decline, and 
assuming the underlying demand for information is unchanged, the elasticity of 
demand with respect to the price charged by information owners increases. So, 
the  loss  in  economic  welfare  associated  with  any  given  price  for  information 
increases.
The second, and critical, point developed in the report is that transaction costs of 
purchase are a fixed cost associated with levying any positive price. Hence, as 
discussed above with respect to micropayments, a price for information that is 
not substantially greater than the transactions cost of purchase cannot possibly 
yield  net  welfare  benefits  when  access  and  distribution  costs  are  low.  But  in 31
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these  circumstances,  and  with  high  elasticity  of  demand,  the  welfare  costs  of 
high prices are likely to be significantly greater than the revenue generated.
In practice, transactions costs associated with pricing access to information are 
often substantially larger than the revenue gained through pricing. For example, 
Bessen (2008) estimates that the cost of litigation concerning patents (other than 
chemical and pharmaceutical patents), is over $12 billion a year and four times 
greater than the profits generated by those patents.
Some rules of thumb
* In any problem of information pricing, it is necessary to consider two choices
(a) whether to charge a positive price, or to provide information free of charge 
and seek funding elsewhere (for example, from tax revenue). One should also 
explore whether volunteers might be able to achieve the goal. 
(b) if a price is to be charged, how to set the price
* If transactions costs are greater than 20 per cent of the price charged, free 
provision, financed by tax revenue, will generally be preferable to any positive 
price
* If transactions costs are small, the optimal pricing policy will be to set price 
equal to the marginal cost of provision with a surcharge (typically about 10 per 
cent) reflecting the social cost of tax revenue
Concluding comments
The case for free ‘gratis’ provision of public sector information has always been 
strong. The rise of the Internet has made the argument for free provision for 
many categories of PSI overwhelming in general. It has also greatly expanded 
the range of activities that are naturally interpreted as information provision, to 
encompass,  among  other  things,  the  activities  of  cultural  institutions  such  as 
galleries, libraries, archives and museums.33
However, technological change and its economic implications have run ahead of 
the organisational and financial structure of public sector institutions, including 
cultural  institutions.  Activities  such  as  digitisation  and  distribution  of 
information  commonly  receive  only  limited  and  sporadic  funding,  and  more 
generally  are  regarded  as  a  peripheral  add-on  to  organisational  missions 
conceived in the 20th, or even the 19th century.  
The  potential  benefits  of  opening  cultural  institutions  up  to  the  community 
through  Web  2.0  technologies  are  huge.  In  part  these  benefits  relate  to  the 
traditional  mission  of  bringing  cultural  content  to  the  public.  Importantly, 
however, there are potential benefits for institutions, including the possibility of 
tapping members of the community for their content, their information, their 
labour  and  their  enthusiasm.  As  far  as  possible,  funding,  pricing  and  access 
policies should facilitate, and not obstruct, the realisation of these benefits.
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